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Abstract. Theory of Mind is commonly defined as the ability to at-
tribute mental states (e.g., beliefs, goals) to oneself, and to others. A large
body of previous work—from the social sciences to artificial intelligence—
has observed that Theory of Mind capabilities are central to providing an
explanation to another agent or when explaining that agents behaviour.
In this paper, we build and expand upon previous work by providing an
account of explanation in terms of the beliefs of agents and the mecha-
nism by which agents revise their beliefs given possible explanations. We
further identify a set of desiderata for explanations that utilize Theory of
Mind. These desiderata inform our belief-based account of explanation.
1 Introduction
Following Premack and Woodruff [36], an agent exercises Theory of Mind if it
imputes mental states to itself and others. Here we explore the role of Theory of
Mind in explanation. Consider the following narrative by way of illustration.
Mary, Bob and Tom are housemates sharing a house. While Tom was
away on a business trip, Mary and Bob noticed a hole in the roof of their
house and called a handyman to fix it. Before the handyman could come,
however, it rained during the night and the floor got wet. Bob, who sleeps
in a windowless room, did not notice the rain. Tom, who just got back
from his trip that day, noticed the rain but did not know about the hole
in the roof. Mary saw Tom return to the house at night and so knew that
Tom knew that it had rained. In the morning, when trying to explain the
wet floor to Bob, Mary tells him that it had rained during the night and
when explaining to Tom she tells him that she and Bob had discovered a
hole in the roof (adding that the handyman will arrive the next day).
Clearly, Mary tailored her explanations to each of her housemates, believing
the information she was providing to them was sufficient to explain the wet
floor in their respective mental states. Her ability to do this stems from her
Theory of Mind - her ability to attribute mental states (e.g., beliefs) to herself
and to others. In humans, the use of Theory of Mind in explanation has been
demonstrated empirically by Slugoski et al. [41] via a set of experiments where
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human participants gave different explanations to different explainees (i.e., the
recipient of an explanation), based on the beliefs of the explainers about the
beliefs of the explainees1. Of course Mary’s explanations are only as good as her
ability to model the mental states of her housemates and how they will alter
their mental states in light of her explanation. Mary’s beliefs about Bob and
Tom’s beliefs, or her belief about how each of them revises their beliefs, may
well be wrong, in which case her explanations to them may fail to explain why
the floor is wet.
Explanation has been studied in a diversity of disciplines. Miller [28] pro-
vides an extensive survey of explanation in artificial intelligence that includes
a selection of historical works in philosophy (e.g., Hempel and Oppenheim [19];
Peirce [32]; Harman [17]), arguing for the important role of philosophy and the
social sciences in future work on explanation. Within AI, early work on explana-
tion included a variety of logic-based and probabilistic approaches to abductive
inference or so-called inference to the best explanation including the early works
of Pople [35], Charniak and McDermott [10], Poole [33], and Levesque [24]. In
the mid 1980s, explanation was popularized in the context of expert systems
where explanations were often generated by backward chaining over a set of
symbolic inference steps (e.g., [18, 40]). Following that time, explanation was a
common element in a diversity of applications of symbolic AI reasoning (e.g.,
[26, 3, 42]). The recent resurgence of interest in explanation is largely in the guise
of so-called Explainable AI (XAI), which is motivated by the need to provide
human-interpretable explanations for decision making in black-box classifica-
tion and decision-making systems based on machine and deep learning (e.g.,
Samek et al. [39]; Gunning et al. [14]).
Numerous researchers have acknowledged the importance of Theory of Mind
in explanation. In the 80s and 90s, formal accounts of explanation such as those
proposed by Ga¨rdenfors [12] and Chajewska and Halpern [7] observed that an
explanation for one agent may not serve as an explanation for another, and the
explainer must therefore tailor an explanation to an explainee given the latter’s
beliefs. Within the space of user modelling and dialogue, and also set in the
80s and 90s, Weiner’s [46] BLAH system and Cawsey’s [6] EDGE system both
tailor explanations to the presumed user model. More recently, researchers have
leveraged belief-desire-intention (BDI) architectures as a natural framework for
explanations reflecting Theory of Mind. Such software architectures can enable
an explainer to explicitly represent its own beliefs, desires, and intentions, as
well as those of an explainee, and to relate explanations to its own beliefs and
goals or those of the explainee (e.g., Harbers et al. [16]; Kaptein et al. [22]).
Most recently, Westberg et al. [47] has posited that incorporating various points
of view on Theory of Mind from the cognitive sciences will facilitate the cre-
ation of agents better suited to communicate and explain themselves to the
humans with whom they are interacting. Additionally, Miller [28] has surveyed
this body of work and has also emphasized the importance of the explainer’s
1 We henceforth use explainer and explainee in reference to the provider and recipient
of the explanation, and explanandum in reference to the thing to be explained.
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ability to tailor an explanation to the explainee, using its understanding of the
latter’s mind. Finally, within the subfield of XAI known as XAI Planning (XAIP)
Chakraborti et al. [8] have implemented XAIP in human-agent teaming settings,
such as search & rescue, where a robot equipped with Theory of Mind capabili-
ties could explain its actions to its human teammate by taking into account the
latter’s mental state.
In this paper we build on the shoulders of previous scholarly work to explore
the role of Theory of Mind in explanation with a view to addressing the diverse
needs of explanation in AI, and XAI in particular. To this end, in Section 2 we
identify a set of desiderata for explanations that utilize Theory of Mind. These
desiderata inform a set of design choices for a belief-based account of explana-
tion which we present in Section 3. Of course not all explanations are created
equal, and in Section 4 we discuss the criteria by which the quality of an ex-
planation can be evaluated. In Section 5 we demonstrate how, in the absence of
an explicit prompt to be explained, our account allows the explainer to simulate
the explainee’s mental state and identify discrepancies that warrant explanation.
Explanations are limited by the coverage and accuracy of the explainer’s beliefs
as well as its reasoning capacity. In Section 6, we show how our account allows for
the modelling of the ignorance and misconceptions of an explainer pertaining to
the mental state of an explainee and how these may affect the quality of explana-
tion. We conclude with a discussion of related work and possible computational
realizations of our general account.
2 Desiderata for Theory of Mind in Explanation
We begin our investigation by reflecting on the key components that support an
agent in imputing mental states to itself and others, reasoning about how the
provision of new information is assimilated into an agent’s existing set of beliefs,
and the circumstances underwhich such information constitutes an explanation
for the explainee. To this end, we identify a set of desiderata that inform our
account of explanation in the sections to follow.
multi-agent: the account must be conceived in a multi-agent setting to support
representation of the beliefs of one or more explainer and explainee.
agent-type agnostic: the account must support a myriad of different agent
types whose beliefs may be internally represented, inspectable, and revisable
in diverse ways. For example, the agent’s beliefs may be stored in a human
brain or in, for instance, the parameters of a neural network or formulae in
a knowledge base.
belief based: the account must model the possibly false or simply incomplete
beliefs of explainers and explainees.
reason about the beliefs of others: the account must allow an explainer to
reason about the explainee’s beliefs when providing the latter with an ex-
planation since, due to their possibly differing beliefs, an explanation for the
explainer may not be an explanation for the explainee.
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support belief revision: the account must enable the explainer to consider
how an explanation is assimilated by the explainee, and in particular how
the latter revises their beliefs given potential explanations which may be
inconsistent with their current beliefs.
explanations can refer to beliefs: the account must allow for explanations
that themselves refer to beliefs. To illustrate why this is useful, consider that
the explainer might explain their having not told the explainee the location
of a party by saying that the explainer believed that the explainee knew the
location.
While previous work has addressed some of these desiderata, in this paper
we propose a belief-based account of explanation in terms of epistemic states of
agents that satisfies all of the aforementioned desiderata by employing a number
of crucial building blocks relating to these desiderata.
3 A Belief-Based Account of Explanation
We appeal to logics of belief to provide a belief-based account of explanation in
the context of Theory of Mind.
Many logical accounts of explanation assume the existence of a knowledge
base—a logical axiomatization of the domain in terms of a set of formulae (e.g.,
[5]). With such a knowledge base in hand, a popular logic-based characterization
of explanation is in terms of abduction as follows.
Definition 1 (Abductive Explanation (after [34])). Given a logical theory,
T , and an explanandum O, E explains O given a theory T if T ∪ E |= O and
T ∪E is consistent.
Here we make no such commitment to the representation of beliefs in terms
of a set of logical formulae. Rather, in order to capture the diversity of hu-
man and machine explainers and explainees, our account finds its origins in
works that attributed agents with mental states in the form of epistemic states
(with seminal work by Ga¨rdenfors [12] and later notable work by Levesque [24];
Boutilier and Becher [4]; Chajewska and Halpern [7]; and Halpern and Pearl [15]).
3.1 Mental States as Epistemic States
We employ the notion of an epistemic state, e, or in the case of multiple agents,
a collection of epistemic states, e, to capture the beliefs of agents. These are
used to provide the semantics for the language below.
We will suppose that we have a finite set of agents, A = {1, 2, . . . , n}, and a
set of propositional symbols P . We define a language
ϕ ::= p |¬ϕ | (ϕ ∧ ϕ) | Biϕ | [ϕ]iϕ (1)
where p ∈ P and i ∈ A. We introduce ⊥ as an abbreviation for (p ∧ ¬p) for an
arbitrary p ∈ P .
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The intended meaning of Biϕ is that agent i believes ϕ, and the intended
meaning of [α]iϕ is that after agent i revises their beliefs by α, ϕ is true.
We assume that our epistemic states are such that we can say that a formula ϕ
is true at e when ϕ is believed. To be clear, although we use formulas to describe
what is believed, an epistemic state is not in general defined as a set of formulas,
nor required to be represented internally as one. For a conventional example, e
might be a set of possible worlds with accessibility relations and so on. However,
we also allow for epistemic states to take very different forms. For example, one
might want to model limited reasoning capabilities in some manner to avoid
the so-called problem of logical omniscience [45], in which agents unrealistically
believe all the deductive consequences of their beliefs. We might also wish for
our epistemic states to be realized in terms of a computer program, such as a
neural network, or via a human brain.
Furthermore, we assume we have a revision operator ∗ so that e ∗ α is an-
other epistemic state, the result of revising by α. We will use * in defining the
semantics for the [α]i operator. Much as we have not committed to a particu-
lar structure for epistemic states, we will not commit to a particular revision
operator. A large body of work has studied belief change in agents where belief
revision typically concerns belief change in a static environment, possibly in the
presence of incorrect and partial beliefs. Amongst the most popular guidelines
for belief revision are the AGM postulates [1], and the DP postulates [11] (for
iterated revision). We will not require that our ∗ satisfies these properties except
where noted. Similarly to the situation with our epistemic states, we might want
our revision operator to be realized in terms of a computer program or human
reasoning.
While epistemic states assign a truth value to any formula in our language
– the language given by the grammar in (1) – that value indicates whether the
formula is believed by the agent in question, not whether it’s actually true. From
an objective point of view, the formulas whose truth values we can determine
are from the subset of the language consisting of formulas which are concerned
only with beliefs. We define this subset of formulas below:
Definition 2 (Agent Formula). An agent formula is one in which no atomic
symbol appears outside the scope of a belief operator, i.e., a formula φ of the
form
φ ::= Biϕ | ¬φ | (φ ∧ φ) | [ϕ]iφ (2)
where ϕ is any (possibly non-agent) formula.
We assign truth values to agent formulas with a collection of epistemic states e =
e1, . . . , en (corresponding to the different agents) according to the satisfaction
relation |= below.
– e |= Biϕ iff ϕ is true at ei
– e |= ¬φ iff e 6|= φ
– e |= (φ ∧ ψ) iff e |= φ and e |= ψ
– e |= [α]iφ iff 〈e1, . . . , (ei ∗ α), . . . , en〉 |= φ
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Note that the semantics of the [α]i operator is defined using the revision operator.
Give this abstract framework for talking about beliefs, we can define expla-
nations. The lack of commitment to the form of the epistemic state and revision
operator is important because it affords us the ability to model a diversity of
agents. In so doing, for the definitions of explanation that follow, the explainer
will have beliefs about the other agents’ beliefs and about their revision oper-
ators, and the effectiveness of the explainer’s explanations for any particular
agent will rely on the fidelity of those beliefs.
3.2 Characterizing Explanations
Definition 3 (Explanation). Given epistemic states e, we say that α explains
β for agent i if e |= [α]i(Biβ ∧ ¬Bi⊥).
Notation: For notational convenience, we define Expl(i, α, β) as an abbrevia-
tion for [α]i(Biβ ∧ ¬Bi⊥).
That is, α explains β if revising by α makes agent i believe β while still having
consistent beliefs.2 Note that (with respect to revising by non-modal formulas) if
revision of agent i’s epistemic state satisfies the AGM postulates, then the result
of revision will be inconsistent only if either the agent initially had inconsistent
beliefs, or if α itself is inconsistent.
Intuitively, our definition of explanation allows for more explanations than
the traditional account in Definition 1. For one thing, we allow explanations to
refer to modal operators. Even without that, though, an important difference
is that our definition is in terms of belief revision and so allows for an expla-
nation that isn’t consistent with the agent’s initial beliefs. Our account builds
upon prior accounts of explanation defined relative to belief revision such as
Boutilier and Becher [4] and Nepomuceno-Ferna´ndez et al. [30].
To make the comparison more explicit, consider defining an epistemic state
ei as a propositional theory T , as in the following theorem.
Theorem 1. Suppose that ei is defined as being a propositional theory T , and
that the formulas ei makes true are defined to be the logical consequences of T
(note that these are restricted to the non-modal subset of our language). Suppose
furthermore that the revision operator ∗ on ei satisfies the AGM postulates (w.r.t.
non-modal formulas). Then for non-modal formulas α and β, e |= Expl(i, α, β)
if T ∪ {α} is consistent and T ∪ {α} |= β.
Proof. Because T ∪ {α} is consistent, by the AGM “vacuity” postulate, T ∗ α
is equal to the expansion of T by α, that is, the closure of T ∪ {α}. Therefore,
T ∗ α |= β.
2 If agent i is not logically omniscient, requiring i to not believe ⊥ may not prevent
i’s beliefs from being inconsistent in some subtler way. For example, i might both
believe p and believe ¬p, even though it does not believe (p ∧ ¬p).
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However, we may also get further explanations. In the circumstances described
by Theorem 1, if T ∪ {β} is inconsistent, then Definition 1 would say there are
no explanations of β given the theory T , while there may be formulas that agent
with epistemic state T can revise by that would make them believe β.
It is also possible to talk in the language about agents’ beliefs about Expl(i, α,
β), i.e. about whether α explains β for agent i.
Definition 4 (Subjective Explanation). Given epistemic states e, we say
that α explains β for agent j from agent i’s perspective, if e |= BiExpl(j, α, β).
Example 1. We formalize our example from Section 1. We assume that Mary,
Bob and Tom all believe (and believe that the other agents believe) rain ∧
holeInRoof → wetF loor.
A = {Mary,Bob,Tom}
e |= BMarywetF loor ∧BMaryholeInRoof ∧BMaryrain
e |= BMaryBBob¬wetF loor ∧BMaryBBob¬rain ∧BMaryBBobholeInRoof
e |= BMaryBTom¬wetF loor ∧BMaryBTomrain∧BMaryBTom¬holeInRoof
e |= BMaryExpl(Bob, rain, wetF loor)
e |= BMaryExpl(Tom, holeInRoof, wetF loor)
We also assume that the agents are able to draw at least simple inferences
(and each knows that the others will) and their belief revision operators behave
in a sensible way (and each knows that the others’ operators do so).
We define a relation ≈ that can be understood intuitively as equating two
epistemic states, ei and ej . For ei ≈ ej to hold, the internal structures of the
states ei and ej need not be the same, but they must support the same beliefs as
each other, and must continue to do so after any sequence of revisions. Formally,
we say that ei ≈ ej if
– e |= Biϕ iff e |= Bjϕ
– and for any sequence of formulas α1, . . . , αk, we have that e |= [α1]i · · · [αk]iBiϕ
iff e |= [α1]j · · · [αk]jBjϕ
Theorem 2. Given epistemic states e and explanandum β, if ei ≈ ej it then
follows that for all α, e |= Expl (i, α, β) iff e |= Expl(j, α, β).
Proof. Note that e |= Expl(i, α, β) iff e |= [α]iBiβ and e |= [α]i¬Bi⊥, and
similarly for agent j. The result follows from the definition of ≈.
That is, when ei ≈ ej, an objective explanation for the former is also an
objective explanation for the latter. Therefore, agent i, acting as the explainer,
need not employ its Theory of Mind and reason about agent j’s beliefs in order
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to generate explanations for the latter. However, the fact that ei ≈ ej does
not mean that ei holds accurate beliefs pertaining to how ej revises its beliefs.
Thus, while any α that explains β may be an objective explanation for both
agents i and j, agent i need not necessarily believe that α is an explanation for
j. Nonetheless, ei ≈ ej is quite strong, as illustrated by the following theorem.
Theorem 3. Suppose ej supports positive and negative introspection – i.e., e |=
(Bjϕ ≡ BjBjϕ) ∧ (¬Bjϕ ≡ Bj¬Bjϕ). Then if ei ≈ ej, agent i will have correct
beliefs about j’s beliefs, i.e., e |= (Bjϕ ≡ BiBjϕ) ∧ (¬Bjϕ ≡ Bi¬Bjϕ).
Proof. If agent j believes ϕ, then we’ll have that e |= BjBjϕ (by positive intro-
spection) and then e |= BiBjϕ (because i ≈ j). Similarly, if agent j disbelieves
ϕ, then e |= Bj¬Bjϕ (by negative introspection) and so e |= Bi¬Bjϕ.
In some cases, an explanation need not cause the explanandum to be entailed
by the epistemic state, but rather cause it to be possible in the epistemic state.
This type of explanation is similar to Boutilier and Becher’s might explanation.
Definition 5 (Inconsistency-resolving Explanation). Given epistemic states
e, we say that α explains the possibility of β for agent i if e |= [α]i¬Bi¬β.
This is a weaker form of explanation but important in various settings such as
when an agent is attempting to find an explanation that will allow the behavior
of another agent or in consistency-based diagnosis, where the agent is attempting
to identify the abnormal componenets in a system that allow for the observed
behavior of the system.
Theorem 4. Given epistemic states e and explanandum β, then for all α, if
e |= Expl(i, α, β) it then follows that α is an inconsistency-resolving explanation
for β for agent i, assuming that e |= [α]i
(
(Biβ ∧ Bi¬β) → Bi⊥
)
, i.e., that the
agent can perform enough reasoning to notice the inconsistency in believing both
β and ¬β.
This follows straightforwardly from Definitions 3 and 5.
Explanations Involving Agent Beliefs
Importantly, an explainer can utilize its Theory of Mind to generate explanations
pertaining to the mental states of other agents, such as their beliefs or goals.
Example 2. Let us reconsider our example where this time, after Mary explains
wetF loor to Bob, he asks her why Tom doesn’t know wetF loor. That is, the
explanandum β is ¬BTomwetF loor. A possible explanation is then
BTom¬holeInRoof , assuming Bob believes BTomrain.
3.3 Explanations Involving Multiple Agents
An interesting setting that is straightforwardly captured by our framework is one
in which an explainer (or explainers) is attempting to explain multiple (possibly
disparate) explanandums to multiple explainees.
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Definition 6. Given epistemic states e and explanandums βj, βk, . . .βl, we
say that α explains βj, βk, . . .βl from agent i’s perspective for agents j, k, . . . l,
respectively, if e |= BiExpl (j, α, βj) ∧BiExpl (k, α, βk) ∧ . . . ∧BiExpl(l, α, βl).
Consider a collaborative card game (e.g., Hanabi [2]) where a certain player
is attempting to make different players (each with a unique epistemic state)
understand different things with a single piece of information about another
player’s cards, publicly announced to all players. The explaining player should
therefore find an α that explains different explanandums for the different players,
given the explaining player’s beliefs about the other players’ beliefs.
Example 3. In a simpler setting such as our running example, if Mary is trying to
explain wetF loor to Bob and Tom at the same time, the explanation α could be
rain∧holeInRoof , where the explanandum for both Bob and Tom is wetF loor.
Privacy Our framework can also capture a notion of privacy. For example, the
explainer (agent i) may want to generate an explanation α that explains the
explanandum β to some agents (agent j) but not to others (agent k):
e |= BiExpl(j, α, β) ∧Bi¬(Expl (k, α, β))
Example 4. If Mary, for some reason, wants only Bob to entail wetF loor, the
explanation α could be rain in which case Bob will entail wetF loor but Tom
will not. One can imagine parent #1 wanting to explain something to parent #2
such that their child does not understand.
Multiple Explainers and ‘Nested’ Explanations In some cases, there may
be multiple explainers trying to explain an explanandum β to an explainee. For
example, agents i and j may want to find an α that explains β for agent k:
e |= BiExpl(k, α, β) ∧BjExpl(k, α, β)
Definition 6 can be straightforwardly extended to capture this setting. Fi-
nally, agent i may want to find an α that he believes that agent j believes is an
explanation for agent k:
e |= BiBjExpl(k, α, β)
4 “Best” Explanations for Whom?
An explanadum can typically be explained by a variety of different explanations,
but it is often the case that an agent prefers one explanation to another rela-
tive to some set of criteria. Indeed, there is a large body of previous work (e.g.,
[24, 25, 4]) that outlines criteria for defining preference orderings over explana-
tions. In the context of a multiple agents, we have seen that what constitutes an
explanation for one agent, may not constitute an explanation for another. This
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observation extends to the notion of preferred explanations—what’s good in the
eyes of the explainer may not be good for the explainee, or for all explainees. We
explore the issue of preferred explanations briefly here in the context of Theory
of Mind.
For each agent in the set of agents A, we define a binary preference relation
≺ over explanations such that ≺i is the preference relation for agent i.
Definition 7 (Preferred Explanation). Given epistemic states e and ex-
planandum β, if α and α′ both explain β for agent i and α i α
′, we say that
α is at least as preferred as α′ for agent i. α ≺i α
′ denotes that α is strictly
preferred to α′ for agent i.
Similarly, we use α i,j α
′ to denote that agent i believes that α is at least
as preferred as α′ for agent j.
Definition 8 (Optimal Explanation). Given epistemic states e and explanan-
dum β, α is an optimal explanation for β wrt ≺i iff α explains β for agent i and
there does not exist an explanation α′ for β for agent i such that α′ ≺i α.
Hilton [20] posits that an explanation given by one agent to another is a
form of conversation and should therefore adhere to Grice’s [13] maxims which
he proposed as part of a model for effective cooperative conversation. In what
follows, we discuss a number of criteria for preferred explanations and relate
them to Grice’s maxims.
Truthfulness: Grice’s first maxim is the quality maxim, according to which
one must not provide information (e.g., to the explainee) that she believes to be
false.
Definition 9 (Subjectively Truthful Explanation). Given epistemic states
e and an explanandum β, α is a subjectively truthful explanation for agent j from
the perspective of agent i iff e |= BiExpl(j, α, β) ∧Biα.
Example 5. In our example, Mary may tell Bob that Tom poured water all over
the floor, thereby explaining wetFloor. However, since Mary does not believe
that Tom did such a thing, it would not be a subjectively truthful explanation
explanation from Mary’s perspective.
Minimality: According to Grice’s quantity and relation maxims, one must
provide information that is relevant, sufficiently informative, and no more infor-
mative than needed. In a Theory of Mind context, the sufficiency of information
is defined relative to the explainer’s beliefs about the explainee’s epistemic state
and the explainer should therefore find the minimal explanation relative to the
explainee’s epistemic state. A large body of work concerned with explanation has
discussed a minimality property which an explanation should satisfy. For exam-
ple, Levesque [24] defines a syntactic simplicity relation between explanations
wherein an explanation is simpler than another if it contains fewer propositional
letters. Minimal explanations in the semantic sense may be defined relative to a
set of possible explanations as those that are implied by all other explanations.
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Plausibility: Grice’s quality maxim also dictates that one should not provide
information that is not supported by evidence. When applying this maxim to
the beliefs of the explainee, an explainer may wish to consider how likely an
explanation is from the point of view of the former. For instance, in our example
it is more likely that Bob will accept rain as an explanation over the highly
unlikely explanation according to which Alan Turing came to visit in the middle
of the night and accidentally poured water all over the floor. Therefore, the
likelihood of an explanation is an important preference criterion when explaining
to ourselves and to others. In the quantitative case, Pearl [31] defines a most
probable explanation while in a qualitative setting the plausibility of explanations
may be defined where the most plausible explanations are those that require the
‘least’ change in the explainee’s epistemic state (e.g., [37, 4]), which could be
defined in various ways, including the degree of held beliefs (e.g., [21]).
5 Explainer-Explainee Discrepancies
To this point our account of explanation has assumed the existence of an ex-
planandum, β, that is in need of explanation for a particular agent. However,
in the absence of such a prompt, the explainer may use her Theory of Mind
to put herself in the explainee’s shoes, so to speak, and to identify discrepan-
cies between the beliefs of the explainee and those of the explainer, or perhaps
in the case of multiple agents, to identify discrepancies between the beliefs of
two agents that the explainer can resolve via an explanation. Discrepancies can
also arise from inconsistencies between an agent’s beliefs and observations in the
world. Such discrepancies are common prompts for explanation in the case of
diagnosis (e.g., [38, 4]).
Definition 10 (Discrepancy). Given epistemic states e, β is a discrepancy
between ei and ej iff e |= Biβ ∧ Bj¬β.
That is, agent i believes β while agent j believes ¬β. The beliefs of agents
pertaining to discrepancies can also be represented in our framework.
Definition 11 (Subjective Discrepancy). Given epistemic states e, β is a
discrepancy between ei and ej from the perspective of agent i iff e |= Bi(Biβ ∧
Bj¬β).
Example 6. In our example, while Mary believes wetFloor, she believes that
Bob believes that the floor is not wet (i.e., e |= BMary(BMarywetF loor ∧
BBob¬wetF loor). Thus, wetF loor is a discrepancy between Bob and Mary’s
respective epistemic states from Mary’s perspective.
Definition 12 (Subjective Discrepancy-resolving Explanation). Given
epistemic states e and a discrepancy β between ei and ej from the perspective of
agent i, we say that α is a discrepancy-resolving explanation for agent j for β
from agent i’s perspective if e |= Bi[α]j¬Bj¬β.
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Example 7. A discrepancy-resolving explanation for wetF loor for Bob fromMary’s
perspective is rain.
Note that Definition 12 appeals to the weaker inconsistency-resolving ex-
planation defined in Definition 5. Thus, the explainer need not find an α that
it believes will allow the explainee to entail the discrepancy. Rather, α should
resolve the discrepancy by explaining its possibility.
We cast agent i as the explainer and agent j as the explainee, and distinguish
between two types of subjective discrepancies: (1) where β is a discrepancy be-
tween ei and ej from the explainer’s perspective; and (2) where β is a discrepancy
between ei and ej from the explainee’s perspective. In (1), as discussed, the ex-
plainer (e.g., Mary) may provide a discrepancy-resolving explanation for β (e.g.,
rain). However, for (2), in order to provide such as explanation the explainer
must believe that the explainee believes that there exists a discrepancy between
ei and ej. If the explainer’s beliefs about the explainee’s beliefs are incomplete
or incorrect, the former may not recognize that such a discrepancy exists.
Explainer as Mediator Definition 11 can be straightforwardly generalized to
capture a setting where agent i believes that there exists a discrepancy between
ej and ek:
e |= Bi(Bjβ ∧Bk¬β)
Agent i may also believe that agent j believes that α is an explanation for
β for agent k, while also believing that α is not in fact a valid explanation for
agent k due to the discrepancy between the epistemic states of agents j and k:
e |= Bi(BjExpl(k, α, β) ∧ ¬Expl(k, α, β))
Using Definition 6, agent i may explain the discrepancy to agents j and
k. Note that the notion of discrepancy discussed here can easily be extended
to encode other, possibly richer notions of discrepancy including the degree to
which the epistemic states of two agents are discrepant.
6 The (In)Adequacy of the Explainer’s Beliefs
The explainer is limited by the accuracy of its beliefs about the explainee’s
beliefs and reasoning capabilities. Specifically, the explainer’s beliefs about the
explainee’s beliefs and reasoning capabilities must be accurate ‘enough’ – ade-
quate – for the explainer to generate ‘good’ explanations wrt the explainee.
Definition 13 (Adequacy). Given epistemic states e and explanandum β, we
say that agent i’s epistemic state ei is adequate wrt agent j iff for all α, e |=
BiExpl(j, α, β) iff e |= Expl(j, α, β).
That is, if agent i’s epistemic state is adequate wrt agent j and β, then it
can generate all explanations (for β) for agent j that are also explanations for
agent j in its actual epistemic state, ej .
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Theorem 5. Given epistemic states e, explanandum β and i,j ,j, agent i’s
perspective of agent j’s preference relation and agent j’s actual preference rela-
tion, respectively, if i,j = j and ei is adequate wrt agent j and β, then for all
α, α is an optimal explanation for agent j from agent i’s perspective wrt i,j iff
α is an optimal explanation for agent j wrt j.
That is, when ei is adequate wrt agent j and when agent i’s beliefs about
agent j’s preference relation are correct, the optimal explanation for agent j from
the perspective of agent i is also the optimal obejctive explanation for agent j.
The proof follows straightforwardly from Definitions 8 and 13.
6.1 Sources of (In)Adequacy
Since most agents do not have a perfect image of another agent’s mental state, an
agent’s beliefs about another agent may be inadequate for a myriad of reasons,
including the inaccuracy of an agent’s beliefs about the beliefs of other agents and
about the way in which other agents revise their beliefs and perform entailment.
In what follows, we focus on a setting where an agent holds inadequate beliefs
about another agent’s beliefs and illustrate using our running example.
Example 8. Returning to our example, assume that Mary forgot that Bob found
the hole with her and so she now falsely believes that Bob believes that there
is no hole in the roof (i.e., e |= BMaryBBob¬holeInRoof). Mary will therefore
believe that rain ∧ holeInRoof is the minimal explanation for Bob (relative to
an intuitive measure of minimality). Notice, however, that in her explanation,
Mary is conveying more information than is needed for Bob to entail wetFloor
(thereby violating Grice’s quantity maxim).
Example 9. Now consider that Mary falsely believes that Bob believes that it
had rained and that there is no hole in the roof (perhaps she confused him
with Tom!). Mary will therefore believe that holeInRoof is an explanation for
Bob. However, e 6|= Expl(Bob, holeInRoof, wetF loor) since Bob does not believe
rain. This time, Mary has violated the quantity maxim by not providing enough
information for Bob to entail wetFloor.
Example 10. Mary now falsely believes that Bob believes wetFloor (i.e., e |=
BMaryBBobwetF loor) and so does not provide him with an explanation, be-
lieving he does not require one. In this case, while wetFloor is an objective
discrepancy between Bob and Mary’s epistemic states, it is not a discrepancy
from Mary’s perspective due to her false beliefs.
Addressing Inadequacy
It is possible to mitigate for the inadequacy of the explainer’s beliefs in a va-
riety of ways. For example, it may be beneficial for the explainer to attempt
to refine its beliefs about the beliefs of the explainee when explanations are not
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understood by the explainee. To this end, the explainer could try to gather addi-
tional pertinent information by acting in the world (e.g., querying the explainee).
Additionally, Sreedharan et al. [44] propose a learning technique which enables
an explainer to learn a simple model of an explainee and decide, based on the
learned model, what information would constitute a good explanation. Further,
Sreedharan et al. [43] show how an explainer may generate explanations that are
applicable to a set of possible explainee models which arise as the consequence
of explainer uncertainty pertaining to the explainee’s model.
Finally, while we emphasized the importance of the explainer modelling the
beliefs of the explainee, our general account could in theory support the ex-
plainee, perhaps compensating for the explainer’s inadequate beliefs, reasoning
about the beliefs of the explainer to understand a given explanation that might
otherwise be construed as inadequate. For example, consider Chandrasekaran et al.’s
[9] discussion of a Theory of AI’s Mind where a human attempting to better un-
derstand a black-box decision making system can do so by familiarizing them-
selves with the system’s capabilities, peculiarities, and shortcomings.
7 Related Work
As previously discussed, we are not the first to propose an account of explanation
in terms of the epistemic state of an agent. Levesque presents a knowledge-level
account of abduction based on the epistemic state of an agent [24]. He provides a
generic definition of explanation that does not commit to a specific type of agent
belief. Then, building on his seminal work on a logic of implicit and explicit belief
[23], he shows how such different formal models of belief lead to different forms
of abductive inference and resultant explanations. Boutilier and Becher [4] simi-
larly appeal to epistemic states to characterize the beliefs of an agent, employing
belief revision to allow for explanations that are inconsistent with the epistemic
state of the explainee. Prior to the works of Levesque and Boutilier and Becher,
Ga¨rdenfors [12] proposed a model of explanation where explanations are de-
fined relative to the epistemic states of agents. While Ga¨rdenfors’s account is
probabilistic, the models proposed by Levesque and Boutilier and Becher are
qualitative. We share the use of epistemic states with all three works, the appeal
to qualitative criteria with Levesque and Boutilier and Becher, and the recogni-
tion of the importance of belief revision with Boutilier and Becher. Nevertheless,
these works all characterize explanation with respect to a single agent providing
no account of the distinct beliefs of the explainee and explainer, nor do they
capture their Theory of Mind.
Nepomuceno-Ferna´ndez et al. [30] propose an account of explanation that
also recognizes the importance of a revision operator and the use of epistemic
states. However, while their Dynamic Epistemic Logic (DEL) based framework
can capture multiple agents, their focus remains on an agent’s task of obtaining
an abductive explanation for itself, rather than for other agents.
Halpern and Pearl [15] proposed a structural model of explanation selection
based on the epistemic state of the explainee. In their work, the explainee’s
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epistemic state comprises a set of situations the explainee considers possible
and an explanation is then meant to remove some of these possible situations
such that the cause of some explanandum may be uniquely identified. Miller
extends Halpern and Pearl’s approach to include contrastive explanations which
are given relative to some counterfactual (e.g, in response to the question ‘Why
P rather than Q? ’) [27]. Halpern and Pearl, however, do not dicuss some of the
necessary elements of Theory of Mind in explanation, such as the notions of
explainer-explainee discrepancies and the adequacy of the explainer’s beliefs.
In the context of XAIP, Sreedharan et al. [44] demonstrate how the model
reconciliation paradigm, proposed by Chakraborti et al. [8], can be generalized
to address the important case where the explainee’s model of the explainer’s
planning model is not explicitly known or not provided in a declarative form.
Our work captures some of the insights in Sreedharan et al.’s work, in addition
to incorporating the notions of epistemic states and belief revision, which in turn
allows us to draw inspiration from the rich body of previous work in the field
where these ideas originated.
We have focused discussion on the subset of work that is most closely related
to the contributions of the paper. For a comprehensive survey of research on
explanation, the reader is directed to [28].
8 Concluding Remarks
The use of Theory of Mind in explanation holds the promise of producing high-
quality explanations that are tailored to the beliefs of the explainee, in the
context of the beliefs (and ignorance) of the explainer. In this paper, we identified
a set of desiderata for explanation that utilizes Theory of Mind. These desiderata
informed our proposed belief-based account of explanation. Key features of this
account are the appeal to epistemic states to capture the mental states of both
the explainer and explainee, and the use of the explainee’s belief revision to
assimilate explanations. Further, we formalized and discussed the notion of a
discrepancy as a property that allows the explainer to anticipate and provide
explanations without prompting. We also presented properties relating to the
adequacy of the explainer’s beliefs with respect to providing an explanation.
This paper has provided a general characterization of explanation without
focusing on its computational realization. This was done by design to allow for a
diversity of explanation scenarios and agent types, including human, black-box
decision maker, or knowledge-based system. Nevertheless in the simplest case if
the beliefs of the explainer are represented as formulae (logical or probabilistic)
then, as observed by Levesque [24] and Boutilier and Becher [4], our notion of
explanation may be realized via an augmentation of existing abductive reasoning
systems such as Theorist Poole [33], for example.
Further, in much of this paper we have been relating our Theory of Mind
characterization of explanation in the context of English-like statements (e.g.,
Mary telling Bob that it had rained last night). However, if we turn to the broad
endeavour of XAI that helped motivate our account, we note that an explanation
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can take on many different forms other than human-interpretable language (e.g.,
a set of weights in a neural network, select pixels, a gesture, a heightening of
intensity in a region of an image). At its core, an explanation is something that
is conveyed by the explainer to the explainee (e.g., by telling, demonstrating,
visualizing, etc.) in order to justify the latter’s belief in some explanandum. For
example, by constructing a heat-map from a medical image, an otherwise black-
box decision-making algorithm can highlight for the explainee the pixels that
have most strongly supported its classification decision [29], thereby allowing the
explainee to assimiliate this explanation into their beliefs and better interpret
the system’s decision. As has been argued in this paper, the decision-making
system, acting as an explainer, should possess the ability to take the epistemic
state of the explainee into account, tease apart the salient features required for
the explainee to justify its belief in the explanandum, and present those to the
explainee as an explanation. Some of these insights pertaining to explanations
for black-box solvers are similarly echoed by Sreedharan et al. in the context
of their model reconciliation paradigm [44] (Section 2). Our general account is
intended to provide building blocks towards this broader XAI objective.
There are several take-aways from this paper that are worth highlighting. Ex-
planations need not be consistent with an agent’s beliefs. As such, contrary to
most logical treatments of explanation, characterizations of explanation should
involve a belief revision component, and not just the expansion of existing be-
liefs to include an explanation. Further, by providing a belief-based account of
explanation that characterizes mental states in terms of epistemic states, and by
allowing for epistemic states and revision operators to be realized in a diversity
of forms from standard logical accounts, to computer programs, neural networks
or human brains, we can capture the mental states of a myriad of different types
of agents. Finally, by characterizing explanations in terms of the explainer’s be-
liefs about the explainee’s beliefs and revision operator, we can capture the role
of Theory of Mind in explanation for a myriad of different types of agents.
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